Not long ago, I blogged about a means for accessing files within VSCs, which was based on a tweet that I had seen. However, I could not get the method described in the tweet to work, nor could others.
Dan/4n6k updated his blog post to include a reference to volrest.exe, which is part of the Windows 2003 Resource Kit (free download). This is a great tool...it is part of the Win2003 resource kit but works on Win10...who knew?
In my earlier blog post, I had tried to make a copy of the System and SAM hives from a VSC; however, I kept receiving errors indicating that the files could not be found. So, I tried using volrest.exe to see if there were any previous versions of files (in this case, folders) available in my profile folder:
Okay, so, are there any previous versions of the System and SAM files available?
The ISC handler's diary recently had a really good write-up regarding malware analysis regarding a malicious Office document, "fileless" malware, and UAC bypass. This is a really good write-up of what the malware does, from start to finish, and provides not only individual indicators, but by providing them in the manner that they're shared, provides a view of the behavior of the malware, as well. This can be extremely useful for detection, by looking to the individual indicators and seeing how you would detect them, perhaps even in a more general case than what is shared.
Not long ago, I remember reading something that stated that one variant of similar malware was using the same sort of UAC bypass technique, and it was changing the Registry value back to the original value after the "exploit" had completed. This is why timeline analysis is so important, particularly when coupled with process creation monitoring. Activity such as this happens far too quickly for a VSC to be created, so you won't have any historical artifacts available. However, the LastWrite time for the key would serve as an indicator, much like the Win32ClockProvider key, or the Policies\Secrets key (per the Volatility team).
Here is another write-up that walks through a similar issue (macro, Powershell, UAC bypass...)...
Not long after sharing some thoughts on ransomware, I ran across this little gem that struck (kind of) close to home. Assuming that this was, in fact, the case (i.e. 70% of available CCTV cameras taken down by ransomware...), what does this tell us about the implications of something like this? The ransom wasn't paid, and the systems were 'recovered', but at what cost, in manpower and time?
RegRipper Plugin Updates
I've updated a couple of the RegRipper plugins; maybe the most notable update is to the userassist.pl plugin. Specifically, I removed the alerts function, and added printing of decoded value names that do not have time stamp values.
One of my co-workers reached to me recently and asked about some differences in the output between the plugin, and what XWays produces. I took a look at it...he'd provided the NTUSER.DAT...and as I was going over the output, I remembered that when I had first written the plugin, I had it output only those entries that had associated time stamps. Apparently, he'd seen something of value, so I modified the plugin to output a list of the value names whose data did not contain a time stamp.
I did not modify the userassist_tln.pl plugin, for obvious reasons.